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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee [hereinafter "Pinetree"] agrees with Ephraim City's [hereinafter "Ephraim City"]
statement of jurisdiction set forth in its opening brief.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Pinetree submits that the following issues are determinitive of this appeal.
Issue 1:

Does Ephraim City's application to Pinetree Associates of its water rate

resolution violate the language contained in its own resolution?
Standard of Review: In interpreting the meaning of ordinances, the reviewing Court is
guided by the standard rules of statutory construction. Brown v. Sandy Citv Bd. of Adjustment,
957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah CtApp.1998). Accordingly, the Court must first examine the plain
language of the ordinance and resort to other methods of interpretation only if the language is
ambiguous. See id. at 210-11.
Issue 2:

Does Ephraim City's application of its water rate resolution to Pinetree

Associates violate the uniform application of laws provision of the Utah State Constitution?
Standard of Review: All issues in this case present questions of law, and the trial Court's
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). "In
scrutinizing a legislative measure under Article I, Section 24, [the reviewing Court] must
determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislation are
legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the
legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Ephraim City utilizes this section to submit inappropriate argument and self-serving

statements. The true nature of this case involves Ephraim City's attempt to unlawfully impose
a per-unit surcharge on each of Pinetree's 30-units of the residence complex owned by Pinetree
Associates dba/Pinetree Condominiums, when Ephraim City originally installed a single water
metering device, approved occupancy, and billed the complex as a single user for several years.
Furthermore, Ephraim City's imposition of the additional unit fees on Pinetree is unconstitutional
since the City did not uniformly apply the same unit charge to other water users having single
meters with multiple users.
B.

Statement of Facts
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Ephraim City to submit "facts

relevant to the issues presented." Ephraim City's factual statement is wholly conclusory and
opinionated. Ephraim City has failed to submit a proper factual background for this appeal. The
Court and Pinetree are under no obligation to ferret out those facts which may appear relevant
to the issues. The statements offered by Ephraim City are not determinative.
Pinetree submits the following statements of fact to which there was no dispute below as
admitted by Ephraim City [Rec. at 634]:
1.

On or about March 14, 1988, Ephraim City adopted Ordinance Number 14-470

("Ordinance 14-470") (Record ["Rec."] at 27 (Defendant's Answer admitting 11 4 of Plaintiffs
Complaint).
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2.

A true and correct copy of Ordinance 14-470 is attached hereto as Addendum "A"

and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Ephraim City maintains public utility systems which provide electricity and water

to residents in dwelling units within Ephraim City. (Rec. at 27)[Defendant's Answer admitting
11 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint].
4.

The members of Pinetree are the owners of thirty condominium units in Ephraim

City (Rec. at 235, [Affidavit of Ken Cahoon, dated July 20, 1994, IF 1], and Rec. at 301,
[Affidavit of Robert Fitch, dated September 20, 1996,11 10]).
5.

All thirty Pinetree Condominium units share one water meter (Rec. at 28,

[Defendant's Answer admitting U 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint] and Rec. at 237 [Affidavit of Ken
Cahoon, U 11]).
6-

When Pinetree was built, personnel from Ephraim City told the general contractor,

Robert Fitch, that having one water meter was the best way to set up the project (Rec. At 300-01,
[Affidavit of Robert Fitch, 11 11 2, 3, 5] and Rec. at 237 [Affidavit of Ken Cahoon, 11 16]).
7.

Ephraim City personnel installed one water meter to serve the Pinetree

Condominium project (Rec. at 301 [Affidavit of Robert Fitch, 11 6]).
8.

On or about June 19, 1991, Defendant adopted a water rate resolution. (Rec. at

29, Pefendant's Answer admitting 11 17 of Plaintiff's Complaint]).
9.

A true and correct copy of the June 19, 1991, water rate resolution is attached

hereto as Addendum "B" and incorporated herein by reference (the "Rate Resolution"). The Rate
Resolution provides in pertinent part that:
4

"All water measured to the customer (dwelling unit, apartment, hotel,
boarding house, trailer, commercial establishment, business, industry,
school, church, etc. shall be paid monthly at the minimum rate of $10.80
for the first seven thousand (7,000) gallons of water used per month.
[Emphasis added.]
Thereafter, all water shall be charged to the customer as follows:
"$0.45 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 23,000 gallons;
$0.60 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 70,000 gallons;
all over 100,000 gallons at the rate of $0.70 per 1,000 gallons used."
10.

The owners of the condominium units pay assessments to the homeowners

association, and the homeowners association pays the water bill because there is only one meter
(Rec. at 28, [Defendant's Answer admitting II 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint]).
11.

After June 19,1991, Ephraim City charged Plaintiff thirty (30) separate minimum

rate charges instead of one minimum rate charge for water measured (Rec. at 238, [Affidavit of
Ken Cahoon, 11 17]).
12.

Since there is only one water meter, it is impossible to measure the amount of

water used by each of the separate condominium units. The correct customer for water use is
Pinetree (Rec. at 301, [Affidavit of Robert Fitch, 11 9]).
13.

Pinetree pays the water bill because there is only one bill and one meter (Rec. at

237, [Affidavit of Ken Cahoon, U 15] and Rec. at 301, [Affidavit of Robert Fitch, 11 8]).
14.

Ephraim City sends a water bill which includes a minimum charge for each

condominium unit, whether it is occupied or not (Rec. at 306, [Affidavit of Ryan Bittner, H 9]).
15.

Not all of the thirty condominiums are occupied during the summer (Rec. at 306,

[Affidavit of Ryan Bittner, U 8]).
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16.

During the summer months, several Pinetree units have been unoccupied and

therefore use no water. Pinetree cannot turn off the water to those units without turning off water
to the occupied units because there is only one meter for the entire project. Ephraim City billed
Pinetree its fictitious $10.80 monthly per-unit minimum charge even though no water has been
used by those units (Rec. at 237, [Affidavit of Ken Cahoon, U 13]).
17.

If Pinetree refused to pay the minimum charge for the unoccupied units, Ephraim

City threatened to discontinue water service which cannot be done without discontinuing service
to occupied units for which payment has been made (Rec. at 237, [Affidavit of Ken Cahoon,
H 14]).
Ephraim City's Brief provides at Paragraph 13 of its Facts that there is no evidence, other
than the Fitch and Cahoon affidavits, which can be marshalled to challenge the lower Court's
findings. Ephraim City fails to consider the admissions in its Answer to the Complaint as set
forth above, Ephraim City's failure to challenge any of the Pinetree's factual statements in support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and its concession to the underlying facts. [Rec. at 328,
HI].
Ephraim City's argument that there is not enough evidence that can be marshaled to show
the judgment is nevertheless incorrect is wanting and a direct byproduct of its inability to
challenge that evidence in the lower Court. Ephraim City has no basis to challenge the lower
Court's ruling on summary judgment and has not met its burden here.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The two issues raised by Ephraim City in its Brief are confusing. On its face, "Issue I"
appears to challenge the Court's award of damages to Pinetree based upon the undisputed facts
found below on summary judgment. The Issue, as stated, therefore, purports to accept the lower
Court's ruling on summary judgment as to Ephraim City's liability for the judgment amount. This
is in concert with Ephraim City's earlier representation to the lower Court that it had no "dispute
in any respect the Court's accurate Historical References nor do we object to the statement by
the Court of the facts established by the pleadings and the stipulation of the parties." [Rec. at
634]. Ephraim City fails, however, to apply the appropriate standard by demonstrating that those
undisputed facts, when weighed in its favor, should have produced a different result.
As it concerns "Issue n," this is a "red herring" and is readily disposed of on the grounds
that Ephraim City independently approved and installed the single water meter to serve the 30
unit Pinetree structure, and initially billed the project as a single user. Ephraim City's argument
omits clear undisputed facts that dispels its claim of error. Further, its claim that its own City
personnel had no authority to permit the single meter installation is nonsense.
Ephraim City appears to place blame upon City officials by their decision to install a
single meter, bill the Association as a single user for several years, and them attempt to retract
the City's earlier decision to do so. Ephraim City claims its error is excusable on a separation
of powers argument and by squeezing into the picture Utah's Condominium Act as being
applicable under the facts here.
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The Court should take note of the extreme deficiencies in the form and format of Ephraim
City's brief to the extent that it is nearly incomprehensible. Furthermore, Ephraim City has
clearly misstated material facts to draw favor to its already losing position.
Assuming there is a palpable issue presented on this Appeal with respect to the lower
Court's finding in Pinetree's favor, Ephraim City has failed to marshall all the evidence to support
the lower court's findings, and then to demonstrate that such are erroneous. Ephraim City argues
that the only available evidence comprises of the Fitch and Cahoon affidavits. Ephraim City
ignores its own acquiescence to the facts recited above and those set forth in the lower Court's
Order on summary judgment. [Rec. at 435-446].
Pinetree, on the other hand, has submitted what are two of the issues that were resolved
below in its favor.

Ephraim City fails to consider the lower Court's interpretation of the

ordinance underlying the City's argument that its interpretation authorizes it to impose multiple
fees on a single customer. Its interpretation was found lacking by each Judge that was involved
in this matter over the last 8 years.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

EPHRAIM CITY'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24(J)» U.R.A.P.

Ephraim City fails to submit a properly supported brief that concerns any one of the two
issues it asserts as being germane. Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
Requirements and Sanctions.
All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not
in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
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Simply stated, even a cursory reading of Ephraim City's brief causes a headache. It is
well established that "a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately
briefed.'1 Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 17 P.3d 1110 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d
299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269 (Utah 1999); Walker v. U.S.
Gen.. Inc.. 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996).
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the "fbjrief of the
appellant shall contain ... [an] argument [that] shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on." Utah RApp.P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). It is also widely held
that an appellate court "is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." Thomas. 974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d
439, 450 (Utah 1988)).
Ephraim City fails to provide any legal foundation for this Court to review the lower
Court's entry of summary judgment. Ephraim City's argument does not challenge the underlying
facts supporting summary judgment, but bases its argument on a later raised issue that City
personnel had no authority to decide the single meter installation. That claim is spurious and
undeserving of consideration on appeal. The strawman set up by Ephraim City cannot overcome
undisputed facts.
POINT n

EPHRAIM CITY INSTALLED THE SINGLE WATER METER DESPITE A REQUEST
OTHERWISE BY PlNETREE

Ephraim City hinges its argument on, and is the single-most piece of fiction offered, the
claim that no member of "city personnel" ever gave Pinetree permission or authority to install
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a single water metering device to the 30-unit complex being built by Pinetree. Aplt. Brf. at 13.
The plain truth, to which fact Ephraim City remains tacit, is that the City of Ephraim installed
the single metering device to measure water delivered to the condominium project at Pinetree.
The City implies that it was Pinetree that in some sense secretly installed the single meter in
defiance of Ephraim City's dictate otherwise. The City offers nothing more than argument to
support that suggestion, as the undisputed facts bear out.
Ephraim City, through its counsel, despite a clear record to the contrary, grossly
misconstrues evidence. Again on Page 13 of its opening Brief, the City makes it appear that
Pinetree never objected to the imposition of thirty separate user fees and only recently sought a
refund. Obviously the last resort is to twist the truth. The record could not be more clear that
this matter was initiated after Ephraim modified its rate structure to impose multiple fees upon
the 30-unit complex. Pinetree has always been served by a single water meter, which was a
requirement imposed on Pinetree by the City. From the outset of the modification to the new
billing practice imposed on Pinetree, it objected.1
Furthermore, Ephraim City challenges throughout its Brief the affidavits of Messrs. Fitch
and Cahoon on grounds of inadmissibility. Ephraim City never formally challenged the legal
sufficiency of the affidavits it now complains of. It is well-settled that the proper method for
attacking the admissibility of an affidavit is by a Motion to Strike, which was not done here. See
D&L Supply v. SaurinL 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989)(Defendant waived claim of evidentiary errors

1

The issue of the single-meter installation was not an issue disputed below. There
was also no dispute that the City installed the meter and billed Pinetree as a single user for many
years. The appellant did not challenge Pinetree's factual basis for summary judgment, and such
cannot be permitted here. [Rec. at 634]
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in affidavit and uncontested facts in memorandum when [it] failed to object at the trial court).
The facts relevant to dispensing of the only palpable issue presented on this appeal are
found in the city minutes from February 17, 1982, as attached to Ephraim City's Brief as
Addendum Lpg 2. A plain reading of the minutes demonstrates that Messrs. Fitch and Cahoon
suggested to the City elders that 30 separate water and electric meter hookups would best serve
the needs of the project. Despite Pinetree's suggestion to the City, it alone acted to convince
Pinetree that a single water meter hookup was the best way to go for the project. It was Pinetree,
not Ephraim City, that conceded to a single water meter connection to the City water system.
Ephraim City seeks to exonerate itself from its own act or omission in recommending and
installing the single water meter and after billing Pinetree as a single user for many years. It
simply is not an equitable resolution to impose additional fees upon the complex after the City
set up the rate structure and delivery method in the first place.
The inequity runs further by the City's charge for water being applied to units that are not
occupied during summer months and therefore have no users. There is no logical method by
which to allocate usage to 30 units that are supplied by a common single meter connection.
Ephraim City suggests that the language of Judge Tibbs' Order dated September 28,1994
[Rec. at 179], mandated that Pinetree install, at its expense, a separate metering device to each
of the 30 units. The Court's statement in its Order was not meant to impose further obligation
on the Pinetree, but certainly implies that if the City wishes to bill each unit as a separate user
then a separate meter must first be installed. Pinetree succeeded to the City's suggestion of a
single water meter installation despite Pinetree's desire otherwise. The City has reached for every
conceivable argument to escape its responsibility to adhere to its Ordinances drafted by the City
11

leaders. Its latest argument is that no single person in the City's hierarchy had authority to permit
the use of a single meter. The City is attempting to set up an estoppel argument against itself,
and is utterly laughable.
POINT m.

THE LOWER COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CITY'S ORDINANCE WAS CORRECT.

Ephraim City fails to address the lower Court's interpretation and strict enforcement of
the City's water rate resolution that formed the basis for the commencement of this action.
Ephraim City only mentions the lower Court's interpretation of the term "measured" as found in
the June 19, 1991, resolution, which provides, in pertinent part:
"All water measured to the customer (dwelling unit, apartment, hotel, boarding
house, trailer, commercial establishment, business, industry, school, church, etc.
shall be paid monthly at the minimum rate of $10.80 for the first seven thousand
(7,000) gallons of water used per month.
Thereafter, all water shall be charged to the customer as follows:
"$0.45 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 23,000 gallons;
$0.60 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 70,000 gallons;
all over 100,000 gallons at the rate of $0.70 per 1,000 gallons used."
(Emphasis added)
Ephraim City ignored the clear, unambiguous language of its own rate resolution and
imposed a separate user fee on each and every unit in the Pinetree complex despite the fact that
the complex only had one meter to supply and measure water. In the context of the resolution,
the customer was Pinetree, a partnership consisting of the owners of the condominium units, and
not the 30 separate units that made up the complex. There is but one interpretation that can be
applied to the water rate resolution. Further, water could not be measured to each unit in the
complex since there was only one meter.
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Ephraim City's Brief, again, falls short of any logical or effective argument to muster a
proper challenge to the lower Court's application of the 1991 resolution to the undisputed facts
here. Ephraim City's suggestion that the interpretation was erroneous stands without any support.
It is well settled that when interpreting the meaning of ordinances, the court must first
examine plain language of the ordinance and resort to other methods of interpretation only if
language is ambiguous. Gardner v. Perry City. 994 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 2000) In this case,
Pinetree asserted that a strict reading of the subject ordinance did not permit the City to impose
multiple fees on a complex supplied by one water meter. The plain construction results in a
narrow interpretation that Pinetree Associates was the billable customer to which water was
measured. Expanding the scope and breadth of the ordinance is not permissible, especially where
the City does not impose those same guidelines on other customers with multiple units, such as
Snow College residences.
Ephraim City has not attempted here, or below to show how its own ordinance permits
it to impose multiple fees on single customers. Its interpretation is contrary to the plain language
of the ordinance.

Furthermore, its interpretation and application renders the ordinance

unconstitutional as discussed below.
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PINETREE'S ISSUE I.
EPHRAIM CITY'S APPLICATION TO PINETREE ASSOCIATES
OF ITS WATER RATE RESOLUTION VIOLATES THE LANGUAGE
CONTAINED IN ITS OWN RESOLUTION.
A.

Ephraim City's water rate resolution applies the rate schedule to water measured
to each customer.
Ephraim City's culinary water rate resolution provides that all water measured to the

customer shall be paid monthly at the minimum rate of $10.80 for the first 7,000 gallons of water
use per month and with a sliding rate for amounts used after that amount.
The rate schedule may be summarized as follows:

B.

Water Used

Rate

$ Per L000 Gallons

up to 7,000 gallons

$10.80

$1.54

next 23,000 gallons

$ 0.45 per 1,000 gallons

$0.45

next 70,000 gallons

$ 0.60 per 1,000 gallons

$0.60

over 100,000 gallons

$ 0.70 per 1,000 gallons

$0.70

Pinetree Condominiums has one water meter and, therefore, the water used bv the
project is subject to only one measure.
Contrary to its own Ordinance, the City fictitiously charged Pinetree Condominium as if

it had thirty water meters, although it only has one. This means that all water used by Pinetree
Condominiums is billed at the rate of $1.54 per gallon, rather than the lower rates ($0.45 to
$0.70) provided for in the Ordinance for amounts over 7,000 gallons. It also means that those
units not occupied in the summer are billed although they use no water at all.
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C.

Ephraim City misapplies its rate schedule to water measured or metered.
It was generally understood that, for each customer, Ephraim City takes one meter reading

and sends one bill. However, contrary to its Ordinance, it does not apply its rates to Pinetree in
such a manner. Ephraim City falsely assumed there were thirty meters, fictitiously divides its
one measured meter reading by thirty and then multiplies by thirty minimum charges. This
means that Pinetree Condominiums pays $1.54 per gallon on the first 210,000 gallons used rather
than the first 7,000 gallons of water used per month. This application of the Ordinance is
inconsistent with the Ordinance language itself.
Ephraim City's water bill resolution applies its rate schedule to water measured to each
customer. Pinetree Condominiums has one water meter and, therefore, the water used by the
Pinetree Condominium project is subject to only one measure. Ephraim City misapplied its rate
schedule to water use measured or metered by Pinetree Condominiums and erroneously charged
Pinetree thirty minimum charges rather than one minimum charge as it had in the past. (Rec. at
692,11 3).
PINETREE'S ISSUE IT.
EPHRAIM CITY'S APPLICATION OF ITS WATER RATE RESOLUTION TO PINETREE
ASSOCIATES VIOLATES THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION.
A.

The Utah State Constitution provides for uniform application of laws.
Section 24, Article I, Constitution of Utah provides that, "All laws of a general nature

shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not
be treated as if their circumstances were the same. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P,.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
15

The Court has stated that Article I, Section 24, protects against two types of discrimination.
First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class [citation omitted]. Second, the
statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences
that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. [Citations omitted.] Id.,
at 670.
B.

Ephraim City fails to apply its water rate resolution equally to all persons within
the same class.
The Pinetree Condominium project only has one water meter. Water is considered a

common area expense for the condominium association. Ephraim City installed one water meter
when the project was built. Had Ephraim City wanted to measure each unit separately, it could
have required each condominium unit to obtain a separate water meter before approving the
plans, installing the water meter, and giving a certificate of occupancy. It did not do so, but
required only one measuring device. Here, the customer is Pinetree Associates. The water use
is considered as a common area expense and becomes the landlords' responsibility rather that the
individual tenants.
As applied to Pinetree Condominiums, Ephraim City is requiring Pinetree Associates to
pay $1.54 per 1,000 gallons for the first 210,00 gallons of water used apparently because there
are thirty small kitchens. A hotel with the same number of bedrooms as contained in Pinetree
Condominiums could arguably use more water because the linen is washed every day. A
commercial establishment, business or industry like a laundry or a manufacturing plant with high
water use requirements could use more water than Pinetree Condominiums. A school with a
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large kitchen to feed students, toilets flushing and large lawn areas, serving as many individuals
as Pinetree Condominiums could use more water.
The City only charges one minimum charge to all of its separate meters and there is no
rational basis for the fictitious thirty meter approach in this case.
C

The water rate resolution classifications and the different treatment given the
classes are not based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the
objectives of the resolution.
The stated objectives for the water rate resolution is set forth in 11 C as necessary to the

health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City of Ephraim. There is no rational basis
for charging the owners of Pinetree Condominiums $1.54 for the first 210,000 gallons of water
measured to the condominium each month and charge other heavy users $1.54 per 1,000 gallons
on only the first 7,000 gallons of water measured to the customer per month.
The minimum charge appears to be a charge to take care of reading the meter and sending
the bill to the user. In the case of Pinetree, there is only one meter read and one bill sent. The
administrative burden is no greater than reading the meter of a single family dwelling, apartment,
hotel, boarding house, trailer, commercial establishment, business, industry, school, or church.
The City is compensated for excessive water use by its graduated rate structure which charges
more for water used in excess of 23,000, 70,000, and 100,000 gallons. There is no rational basis
for the fiction engaged by Ephraim City in its billing water to Pinetree Associates.
CONCLUSION
Ephraim City's application to Pinetree Associates of its water rate resolution violates the
language contained in its own resolution and by doing so violates the Uniform Application of
Laws Provision of the Utah State Constitution. Ephraim City has not specifically challenged the
17

lower Court's interpretation of the ordinance in Pinetree's favor, or has it demonstrated that its
interpretation differs from that of the lower Court's plain reading
Ephraim City has failed to apply its Ordinance 14-470 and water rate resolution according
to its clear and unambiguous terms to Pinetree Associates and, as applied, Ordinance No. 14-470.
Interpreting Ordinance 14-470 as urged by Ephraim City would cause an unconstitutional
application of the Ordinance under the Utah Uniform Application of Laws Provision of the Utah
State Constitution.
Ephraim City has merely re-argued the same facts that were presented below, and
continues to argue against facts that it agreed were undisputed. The brief is its identical motion
presented for summary disposition. There was never any challenge below to the affidavits of
Cahoon and Fitch. The "unidentified City official" that had no authority to permit the installation
of a single meter at Pinetree is pure smoke and mirrors and was a last ditch argument. That
argument presumes that the City installed the single water meter, and spuriously challenges its
own authority to do so some 20 years after the fact. The evidence is clear that Ephraim City
installed the single meter, not Pinetree. The City approved occupancy on final inspection with
full knowledge of the single meter. The argument posted by Ephraim City is but an example of
the paltry issues presented on this appeal.
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed on
all issues, including damages. Ephraim City has not challenged the amount of damages found
by the lower court.
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.

Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides damages for delay or frivolous
matters by the recovery of attorney's fees. Pinetree has been left to guess what error Ephraim
City claims to have been manifest error or any error to warrant summary reversal. Ephraim City
fails to address the Constitutional issues that were decided in Pinetree's favor on summary
judgment, or the estoppel issues that were raised in opposition to Ephraim City's Motion for
Declaratory Judgment. All issues were decided in Pinetree's favor below, and Ephraim City
continues to state otherwise. The Rule permitting an award of fees provides:
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
As the record will bear out, Ephraim City has filed countless pleadings all directed to the
same issues that were resolved against it. Ephraim City attempted no less than three times below
to rehash decided issues under a myriad of pleadings that were not permitted by Rule. In this
appeal, Ephraim City has used its Docketing Statement, a motion for summary disposition, and
inappropriate portions of its Brief, to interject its contaminated arguments on issues that had no
bearing below, and were argued for the first time AFTER entry of summary judgment.
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Affirmation below is just and proper.
DATED this d- '"^day of February, 2002.

BRAUNBERGER, BOUD & DRAPER, P.C.

Wayne H. Bfraunberger
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed postage
prepaid on the C*- v

day of February, 2002, to the foUowing:

Ken Chamberlain
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
225 North 100 East
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701

CL>^pA£L
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ADDENDUM "A"

the effective date of this title, the buildORDlNANOElHi^TU"
AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING vacated without paying for said utility
LANDLORDS TOBERESPONSIBLE services incurred shall not be restored
FOR THEIR TENANTS POWER, to service until all unpaid amounts for
WATER AND SEWER UnLTTIES said services are paid in full.
Section IV: PAYMENT*.
SUPPLIED BY EPHRAIM OTY.
All payments under this Ordinance
WHEREAS, Ephraim City has suffered excessive losses as a result of shall be due and payable on the date
renters removing themselvesfromthe specified in Ephraim City's normal
city without paying for their utilities. billing procedures.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORSection V: PENALTY
DAINEDBYTHECITYCOUNCE-OF
Any person guilty of violating this
BPHRAMCTTY AS FOLLOWS:
Ordinance shall be guilty of a Class B
Section I: OWNER'S OBLIGA- Misdemeanor.
TION
Section VL EFFECTIVE DATE
All owners or agents of real propThe City Council finds it necessary
erty located in the City of Ephraim are for the health, safety and general welhereby obligated to assume and be fare of the residents of Ephraim City
responsible for all utilities, water, that this Ordinance shall take effect
sewer and power amounts assessed to immediately upon publication in a
their tenants, lessors or rentors.
newspaper of general circulation in the
Section It CITY'S OBLIGATION City of Ephraim.
PASSED and APPROVED by the
Ephraim City will notify all owners
or agents of real property located in the City Council of Ephraim City, this
City of Ephraim within ten (10) days 14th day of March, 1988.
when their tenant, lessor or rentor's ROBERT E. WARNICK
EPHRAIM CITY MAYOR
utility payment is delinquent.
Attest:
Arlene DeLecuw
Section HI: HOOK-UPS
All utility service* having been cut Ephraim. City Recorder
off for non-payment or any nook-ups Publish Ephraim Enterprise, March
where tenants, rentora or lessees have 17.1S83

EXHIBIT.
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ADDENDUM "B"

RESOIOTICN NO.
A RE90UOTIQN AMH1DING THE CULINARY WATER RATE STRUCTURE TO ENSURE THAT
AIL TH^F THAT UTILIZE CULINARY WATER SUPPLIED BY EPHRAIM CITY BE CHARGED IN
AOOQRDANCE WITH SUCH USE;
NOWf THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF EPHRAIM.UIAH, THAT
THE WATER RAXES BE AS FOLLOWS:
A. DEFINITIONS:
1. Dwelling - A ouilding or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential
occqpancey, tait not including hotels, tourist cabins, and boarding hoises.
2. Dwelling Unit -One or nore rooms and a single kitchen, in a dwelling or apartment hotel, designed as a unit for occupancy by one family, individual. and/or individuals for living and sleeping purposes.
3. Hotel - Any building containing six or more rooms intended or designed to
be used for sleeping purposes by transient guests, but in which no provision is made
for cooking in any individual room or suite.
4. Housing, Boarding _- A, building containing only one kitchen and sleeping
rooms where, for compensation, lodging and/or meals are provided for more than two
(2) persons.
5* Kitchen - Any room used for or intended to be used for cookin<j ana preparing
food.
6. Trailer - A vehicle designed for or used for human habitation.
B. WATER RATES: All water measured to the/customer? (dwelling unit,a-kirtment, hotel,
boarding house, trailer, commercial establishment, business, industry, school, church,
etc.) shall be paid monthly at the minimum rate of $10.80 for the first 7,000 gallons
of water used per month.
Thereafter all water used shall tx; charged to the customer as follows:
$0.45 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 23,000 gallons
$0.60 per 1,000 gallons used for the next 70,000 gallons
.All over 100,000 gallons at the rate of(|oT79>per 1,000 gallons used
C. EFFECTIVE DATE: It is the opinion of the City Council that it is u cessary to
the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City of Ephr urn that this
Resolution take effect July 1st, 1991.
PASSED AND APPROVED, by the City Council of the City of Ephraim, Utah, this 19th
day June, 1991.

ATTEST:

EXHIBIT

b

